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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Counterlife 
President-elect Vladimir Putin accepted the resignation of his sitting government, 
and announced the formation of his new government under the leadership of 
Mikhail Yefimovich Fradkov. Oh wait a minute, Putin hasn’t been re-elected yet. 
 
An arrogant Russian president, confident of re-election, decided to show his 
citizens the future he has planned for them, without bothering to wait for their 
electoral input. And we’re supposed to be grateful that he chose a ‘colorless 
bureaucrat’ with tenuous ties to the power ministries rather than a full-on silovik? 
 
Putin dismissed the Kasianov government at a Kremlin State Council meeting, 
much to the surprise of at least several ministers. (1) The unexpected dismissals 
led a few to leap to the Yel’tsin analogy as if there were something in the water at 
the Kremlin that makes leaders act erratically/ (hmmm) But Yel’tsin was, despite 
everything else, a political creature with a remarkable sense of the populace; 
Putin has built, deliberately, an image of the cool, calculating, even cold-blooded 
leader. His decision to catch his ministers, citizens and all observers off-guard 
wasn’t punitive or a reflection of the need to jolt people from their complacency. It 
was arrogance. 
 
The government’s dismissal in itself was a shock, but there is no indication that 
the new government will be anything more than a true personnel reshuffle: same 
cards, same players, just a rearrangement of the order and the portfolios dealt. A 
relief, of sorts, for the business community, but nevertheless, the odd political 
whim of a supremely confident president. 
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"The smaller the staff, the more effective the civil servants" (2) 
Mikhail Yefimovich Fradkov is a veteran in Russian government circles, serving 
as a deputy to Pyotr Aven in the first Foreign Economic Relations Ministry (yes, 
Pyotr Aven of Alpha fame and wealth), and eventually coming into control of the 
ministry himself under Chernomyrdin, for whom he tried to subdue the arms 
giant, Rosvooruzhenie, and bumbled away a multi-million dollar contract instead. 
(3) He served in Yel’tsin’s administration on and off, eventually becoming Trade 
Minister in Sergei Stepashin’s government in 1999. Stepashin, who made clear 
at the time that his choice for First Deputy Prime Minister was the same 
Aleksandr Zhukov that Fradkov has now tapped, put together a government line-
up with figures whose names are remarkably familiar today (e.g., Khristenko, 
Matvienko, Pochinok, Kasianov, etc.). (4) 
 
In 1998, when President Yel’tsin upbraided two or three ministers from the 
Chernomyrdin-led government, the then Prime Minister let loose his assessment 
of Fradkov’s shortcomings (making clear that Fradkov had earned Yel’tsin’s 
wrath): "You lack initiative. You don’t bother. This is absolutely inadmissible for 
such a ministry." (5) 
 
When Putin became Prime Minister in 1999 however, Fradkov’s star began a 
slow ascent again as he was named Sergei Ivanov’s deputy in the Security 
Council. (There is some indication that Fradkov’s "ties" to the siloviki were 
solidified at this time.) From there, Putin put Fradkov in charge of the Tax 
Ministry until its dissolution. At the time of his appointment as President Putin’s 
Prime Minister nominee (The Duma has since confirmed his appointment), 
Fradkov was Russia’s representative to the European Union. 
 
As Prime Minister, Fradkov is promising a streamlined government, reducing 
ministries from 24 to about 15. There also will be strong parliamentary 
representation, especially since last December’s elections produced such a 
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formidable pro-Putin party majority. (6) Current evaluations of the qualities Putin 
sought in a Prime Minister, and apparently found in Fradkov, are typified, 
interestingly enough, in comments by Anatoli Chubais. "Russia has few experts 
of such excellence and experience as Mr. Fradkov. (…) Mr. Fradkov has vast 
experience that can upgrade Russian politics to a European class, and send 
them – literally and figuratively speaking – along European channels." (7) 
 
As for Aleksandr Zhukov, Fradkov’s choice for First Deputy, he is a western-
educated (Harvard) economist, who has worked in the State Duma’s Budget 
Office and is a strong supporter of tax reform. (8) Further government 




(1) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 Feb 04; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. The manner of this 
dismissal seems to call out for an examination of who knew what and when. 
Apparently, several Kremlin apparachiki were taken by surprise by the 
President’s decision as well. 
(2) Prime Minister nominee Mikhail Fradkov on his plans to streamline 
government, ITAR-TASS, 2 Mar 04 via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), #8097, 3 
mar 04. 
(3) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 Jun 03; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(4) Kommersant, 26 May 99; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) The Moscow Times, 2 Mar 04 via JRL, #8095, 2 Mar 04. 
(6) Agence France Presse, 2 Mar 04 via JRL, #8097, 3 Mar 04. 
(7) RIA-Novosti, 1 Mar 04 via JRL, #8095, 2 Mar 04. 
(8) The Moscow Times (moscowtimes.ru), 4 Mar 04. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
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By Fabian Adami 
 
Yandarbiyev killing: assassination or internecine murder? 
A week after the Moscow Metro bombing, on February 13, former Chechen 
President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev was killed in Doha, Qatar. According to news 
reports, Yandarbiyev was traveling home from a mosque, when his Toyota Land 
Cruiser blew up. Yandarbiyev died of his wounds in hospital, while his 13 year 
old son and two bodyguards were also killed in the blast. (1) 
 
Yandarbiyev served as interim President of Chechnya between April 1996 and 
January 1997, when he resigned his post, having lost an election to Aslan 
Maskhadov. Subsequently, Yandarbiyev served as Maskhadov’s personal envoy 
to "the Muslim states," and as "Ichkerian representative to Afghanistan." (2) He 
had long been suspected of fund-raising activities for Chechen separatists by 
Russian Security Services, and he was, at the time of his death, high on Russia’s 
most wanted, as well as international fugitive lists, charged with membership in 
an "illegal armed formation," and the attempted murder of law-enforcement 
officials. (3) 
 
In the two weeks since his death, several theories as to who killed Yandarbiyev 
and why have been aired. Not surprisingly, the prime suspects in the ‘who killed 
Yandarbiyev?’ debate are the Russian Security Services. 
 
Aleksandr Litvinenko, a former FSB Colonel living in London, has said that he 
has "no doubt" that Yandarbiyev was killed by Russian Special Services. (4) But 
as always, Litvinenko’s utterances must be viewed with some suspicion. A more 
realistic picture of whether Yandarbiyev was indeed killed in a "wet" operation 




First, in Moscow, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, called the allegations of an 
assassination "rumors spread by the authorities of Qatar." (5) The FSB’s PR 
Center released a statement saying that the FSB had no involvement in the 
incident, and therefore had "nothing to say on the matter." (6) Similarly, the SVR, 
through its spokesman, Boris Labusov, stated that "I’m not going to say anything 
new. Ivanov offered an exhaustive commentary." (7) Labusov added that the 
SVR "has not taken part in such actions since 1959." (8) Several Secret Service 
veterans, including Leonid Shebarshin (head of SVR between 1989-1991), Oleg 
Nechinporenko, and Mikhail Lyubimov, have also spoken out, stating in an 
interview with Novye Izvestia, that "it doesn’t look like a secret service operation." 
(9) Whether these statements constitute standard denials or the truth, the fact 
remains that three Russian "intelligence officers" were arrested at Dubai airport 
in the United Arab Emirates, while trying to board a flight to Russia. According to 
Kommersant, the three men boarded a ship departing for the Emirates shortly 
after the blast. The officers were brought back to Qatar on 18 February, where 
one of the men was released because he held a diplomatic passport. (10) More 
importantly, the two still being held were carrying service, not diplomatic 
passports, and Foreign Minister Ivanov has admitted that the men were in Qatar 
on a mission to "collect and analyze information relating to fighting international 
terrorism," and that Yandarbiyev was being investigated at the time of his death. 
(11) 
 
At this point in time, the Yemeni government has stated that the two officers will 
receive an "open trial," (12) but has thus far refused Russian diplomats access to 
the two men. According to ITAR-TASS, the Russian ambassador's requests to 
meet with the men have been met with constant "refusals." Ivanov has also 
spoken out on this matter, maintaining that the Yemenis ignored "all the 
elementary norms of international relations" in arresting men who had been 
carrying out their duties "without violating local law." (13) Ivanov filed a formal 
protest with Yemen’s ambassador to Moscow on 26 February, and there has 
been no change in the detainees’ status since then. 
 6 
 
The second theory that has been aired with regard to Yandarbiyev’s death is that 
he was killed as part of an internecine quarrel between rival Chechen gangs. 
Rudnik Dudayev, Secretary of the Security Council of Chechnya, has stated that 
it is his belief that Yandarbiyev was killed in connection with "financial disputes:" 
apparently, several years ago, Yandarbiyev pocketed resources that were 
earmarked for Basayev’s and Doku Umarov’s rebel groups in Chechnya. (14) 
There is a considerable Chechen exile community in Qatar, and it is entirely 
possible, according to Nikolai Kovalev, former FSB Director and current 
Chairman of the Duma’s Veteran’s Affairs Committee, that Yandarbiyev was 
targeted by one of them for the aforementioned reasons. (15) 
 
A third theory, which at this point has been given little credence or discussion is 
that the Security Services did not kill Yandarbiyev themselves, but rather 
facilitated the killing. It is interesting to note that the two remaining detainees 
have not been charged with murder by Yemeni authorities. Instead, the men are 
charged with complicity in the act, and with using their "operative and diplomatic" 
capabilities to help the killers across the border, and provide them with the 
"necessary documents, transport and accommodation." (16) 
 
But which is the most likely theory? As usual, the question must be asked: who 
benefits? In this case, it is difficult to see how the Chechen cause would benefit 
from Yandarbiyev’s death. On the other hand, there might be a great deal to gain 
politically from Yandarbiyev’s death, in the approach to this month’s Presidential 
elections. As mentioned previously, Yandarbiyev ranked high on Russia’s most 
wanted list, and he was hiding in many senses, in plain sight. It is possible that 
the arrest in Qatar of Russian Security Service officers constitutes a major failed 
‘extraction’ operation. Rossiiskie Vesti remarked on 24 February that 
Yandarbiyev’s death would "facilitate a reduction in the ability of Chechnya’s 
irreconcilable separatists to receive funding from abroad." (17) It would seem to 
be no coincidence that someone viewed as playing "nearly as important a role in 
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the Chechen resistance as Maskhadov or Basayev" (18) was killed so close to 




(1) WPS, 27 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database.  
(2) WPS, 24 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) BBC Monitoring, 26 Feb 04, Ekho Moskvy Radio via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(5) WPS, 27 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Agence-France-Presse, 13 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(9) WPS, 27 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(10) Kommersant, 27 Feb 04; Izvestia Press Digest via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database.  
(11) Izvestia Press Digest, 27 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database.  
(12) RIA Oreanda-Economic and Polit Press Review, 27 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database.  
(13) Izvestia Press Digest, 27 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database.  
(14) ) Rossiiskie Vesti, "The Strange Death of a former President of Chechnya’, 
18 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(15) WPS, 24 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database.  
(16) Izvestia Press Digest, 28 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database.  
(17) Rossiiskie Vesti, "The Strange Death of a former President of Chechnya’, 18 
Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database.  





Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
 
Russian-E.U. relations get chilly over extension of agreement to new 
members 
A debate over the European Union’s (E.U.) enlargement is cooling its relations 
with Russia. As the 1 May 04 deadline approaches for Russia to ratify the 
extension of the Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA), thus extending all 
the terms of its agreements on Russian-E.U. relations to the ten new members, 
Moscow appears committed to set certain conditions on the future of those 
relations. So far however, the E.U. is resisting any changes. 
 
In early February, ITAR-TASS reported that the Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) 
had submitted a list of 14 "unresolved issues" to the E.U., which Russian Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov described as being connected to a compromise over 
Russia’s signing the PCA. (1) A February 4 RFE/RL report described the list as 
"at best, tenuously linked to enlargement." It includes issues concerning: anti-
dumping measures, cuts in farm exports subsidies, exemption of new member 
states from certain E.U. regulated limitations (e.g., on aircraft noise and energy 
import ceilings), concessions from Lithuania on Kaliningrad, lifting of visa regimes 
on Russian citizens in the new member countries and concerns over the welfare 
of ethnic Russians in the some of new member countries. (2) Russia has also 
identified among its concerns: compensation for the €300million loss it expects to 
incur as a result of E.U. enlargement, E.U. acceptance of fighting in Chechnya as 
related to the global war on terrorism and the creation of a joint body within the 
E.U. similar to its presence at NATO that would give it more say in E.U. 
discussions. 
 
The E.U., however, does not see the extension of the PCA as negotiable. The 
E.U. Council stated that Russia’s ratifying the extension of the PCA before the 1 
May deadline would "avoid serious consequences." The Russian side 
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immediately interpreted this as a threat of sanctions against Russia. Further 
countering the Russian list of issues, which E.U. officials and the Western press 
refer to as "the 14 Russian demands," the Irish ambassador, Justin Harman, 
(Ireland currently holds the presidency of the E.U.) forwarded a note to Moscow 
reminding the Kremlin of the four common areas of cooperation between the E.U. 
and Russia as agreed to at the Russia-E.U. summit in St. Petersburg in May 
2003: The economy; freedom, justice and security; external security; and 
education, culture and research. The note then addressed the E.U.’s 
disappointment in Russia’s lack of progress in some of these areas, specifically 
identifying some of the E.U.’s questions over the lack of a ratified border 
agreement with the Baltic states, the E.U.’s desire for Russian approval to send 
humanitarian aid to the northern Caucasus, Russian ratification of the Kyoto 
protocol, Russian closure of old nuclear reactors, and others issues. 
 
Russian officials rejected what they call the E.U. "ultimatum." European 
Integration expert, as Interfax described Sergei Markov, suggested that Moscow 
stop dealing with the E.U. "bureaucrats" and negotiate directly with the European 
countries’ leaders themselves. (3) 
 
Ambassador Harman, in a 24 February Ekho Moskvy radio interview, denied that 
the E.U. is threatening Russia with sanctions and announced that Igor Ivanov will 
be meeting with E.U. officials in Ireland soon to discuss the legality behind the 
extension of the PCA as well as "what answers the E.U. can provide Russia over 
the issues that concern it." (4) Harman’s statements, however, indicated that the 
E.U. was not considering any changes in the agreement’s terms in order to get 
Moscow to sign it. 
 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Chizhov may have attempted to break 
the ice when he declared on 26 February that he had no doubt Russia would 
extend the PCA to the new members…after Russian problems were resolved or 
their resolutions mapped out. Additionally, he contradicted earlier Russian 
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indignation over E.U. actions by saying that he was unaware of any "official" E.U. 
statements threatening sanctions. (5) 
 
Neither the E.U. nor Russia appears willing to accept a deadlock over the 
agreement, considering their mutual economic, political and security importance. 
This means that some imaginative diplomacy will be required over the next two 
months. A first step in this direction may be evident in Russian President Vladimir 
Putin’s nomination of his former envoy to the E.U., Mikhail Fradkov, as his new 
Prime Minister. 
 
Moscow-Washington: The suspicious alliance? 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov submitted an editorial to the Washington 
Post on 6 February regarding the state of U.S.-Russian relations; the Post, 
however, did not publish the article, citing "a conflict with ‘editorial policy.’" (6) In 
the article, Ivanov claims that the joint orders from President George W. Bush 
and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the September 2003 Camp David 
Summit to "promote cooperation in a broad range of areas" have been carried 
out. (7) Indeed, evidence to back this claim up is not difficult to find. Examples of 
U.S.-Russian cooperation abound – in space, in non-proliferation efforts, in trade, 
through cooperation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Russia 
relationship, and in the global war against terrorism. 
 
At the same time however, there is an adversarial dialogue between the two 
states more reminiscent of the Cold War. On 12 February, speaking at a 
conference in Munich, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov voiced 
Moscow’s objection to the Baltic states’ joining NATO without first signing the 
CFE Treaty. He likewise expressed disapproval of the possibility of the U.S. 
establishing military bases in Poland or in the Baltic republics. As useful 
corroborating evidence for Defense Minister Ivanov, the Associated Press just 
reported that U.S. "military experts" were visiting Poland, Romania and Bulgaria 
to evaluate sites as potential future military bases. (8) 
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Sergei Ivanov hinted that if the Baltic states were in NATO but did not sign the 
CFE Treaty, then Russia would consider abandoning the treaty as it would mean 
the treaty was "cut off from reality." (9) He also stated that NATO troops in the 
Baltic states might be countered by the deployment of Russian forces to the 
Kaliningrad enclave. To prevent such a possibility, Ivanov proposed Russia be 
allowed to send observers to the region to confirm that NATO was not 
establishing such bases. 
 
More suspicion from Moscow was voiced by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Igor Ivanov who told Duma deputies that he was not sure that the U.S. program 
to build a global missile defense shield was not targeted against Russia and 
pledged, therefore, to "keep a careful eye on the implementation of the plans to 
create a strategic ABM so that they do not damage our security." (10) 
 
An even more graphic depiction of how Moscow possibly perceives NATO’s 
activity was painted by Mikhail Margelov, the chairman of the Russian Federation 
Council international affairs committee. Speaking at an international conference 
in Berlin on 23 February, Margelov said, "Russia is being outflanked from the 
south east in Central Asia with [NATO’s] Partnership for Peace [program], which 
is being transformed into a military cooperation program. As for the Baltic states’ 
joining NATO, it is a go at Russia's north west, which also strengthens the anti-
Russian make up of the alliance along with the mood of the [political] elite in 
these countries. (…) NATO is actively making advances to Georgia and 
Azerbaijan on the southern borders of Russia and at the same time it is setting 
up ‘special relations’ with Ukraine [to Russia’s] south-west." (11) He did, 
however, conclude with assurances that Moscow had no intention of ending its 
partnership with NATO or of abandoning the CFE Treaty. 
 
The numerous examples of U.S.-Russian cooperation, particularly in the 
framework of the acclaimed alliance against terrorism, temper the recent rhetoric 
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of suspicion from Russian officials which could be seen as an attempt to make 
the relationship more adversarial. Why does Moscow need to make all this 
"noise," as independent Russian analyst Pavel Felgenhauer described Sergei 
Ivanov’s CFE-related comments? (12) While there is still time for Russia to 
maneuver to counter U.S. and NATO presence and activities elsewhere in its 
near-abroad (i.e., the Caucasus and Central Asia), it is the eleventh hour for 
complaints about NATO plans in the Baltic republics. Moreover, the Kremlin’s 
depiction of these actions of NATO and the U.S. as suspicious and disquieting, 
gives it the opportunity to further claim that such "threats" warrant and even 
justify its own military presence in Georgia and Moldova. 
 
Moscow chooses Japan over China in pipeline project options 
It appears Moscow may have finally made a decision about which oil pipeline 
project it prefers for exporting its Far East crude oil. After nearly a year of 
debating which option was more beneficial, the Russian Minister of Energy, Igor 
Yusufov, made statements indicating that Moscow has selected the Angarsk-
Nakhodka pipeline plan over the Angarsk-Daging version. The latter would 
provide China with approximately 30 million tons of Russian crude oil annually, 
while the former is expected to provide 50 million tons per year primarily to 
Japan. It would also provide crude oil exports to other Pacific customers such as 
the U.S., South Korea and Singapore. 
 
Despite statements by the Kremlin officials that the Angarsk-Daging and 
Angarsk-Nakhodka projects were not mutually exclusive, the Chinese and 
Japanese sides were, nonetheless, competing for the selection of their 
respective preferences. As early as October 2003, press reports began indicating 
that Moscow was leaning more towards the Japanese option. As Moscow 
maintained that such a decision would be based on its own interests, it is likely 
that Japan’s proposals to invest $7 billion into the project tipped the scales. 




Whether China accepts that or sees it rather as a political decision remains to be 
seen. Beijing has no doubt taken notice of the improved state of relations 
between Moscow and Tokyo of late. This month, Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Aleksandr Losyukov talked up those relations stating that they were in a 
"process of rapprochement" and that "‘the future of the Asia-Pacific community 
and the direction of its further development’ largely depend on [Russia and 
Japan]." (13) Moreover, the pipeline is likely to strengthen ties in general with the 
countries the pipeline services, further alienating China. Just to be safe, on the 
same day as Yufusov’s "announcement," Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Aleksandr Saltanov met with the Chinese ambassador to Moscow, Liu Guchang, 
and assured him that Moscow’s "one-China" policy towards Taiwan remains 
unchanged. 
 
China and Russia share many ties, including military cooperation, participation in 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), arms sales and technology 
transfer agreements, as well as the common interests of stability on the Korean 
peninsula and countering U.S. influence in Asia. Thus, Russia’s choosing Japan 
over China in the pipeline project is unlikely to create any unbridgeable rifts. In 
any event, Beijing has not given up hope yet; an official with the China National 
Petroleum Corp (the Chinese company backing the Chinese pipeline option) was 
quoted as saying this decision was not the Kremlin’s final one and that there was 





(1) 4 Feb 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0204 via World News Connection. 
(2) RFE/RL, 4 Feb 04 via Johnson's Russia List (JRL) #8047, 4 Feb 04. 
(3) 24 Feb 04 via JRL #8083, 24 Feb 04. 
(4) 24 Feb 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
 14 
(5) RIA, 26 Feb 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(6) KOMMERSANT, 13 Feb 04; What the Papers Say (WPS) via JRL #8065, 13 
Feb 04. 
(7) KOMMERSANT, 13 Feb 04; WPS via JRL #8065, 13 Feb 04. 
(8) 9 Feb 04 via JRL #8057, 10 Feb 04. 
(9) RFE/RL, 9 Feb 04; JRL #8057, 10 Feb 04. 
(10) ITAR-TASS, 12 Feb 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(11) RIA, 23 Feb 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(12) (http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/02/10/014.html). 
(13) ITAR-TASS, 11 Feb 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(14) SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 25 Feb 04 via JRL #8084, 25 Feb 04. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
ELECTIONS 
When 1 + 1 equals a lot more than 2 
Despite the recently reported demographic drop, Russia has enjoyed a surge of 
new voters. According to data from the Central Election Commission (CEC), the 
number of voters has increased by about 400,000 in the past few months; this 
was on top of a huge gain of almost two million new voters who appeared 
inexplicably on the rolls in the first half of 2003. While the chief of the State 
Statistics Committee’s census and demography department, Irina Zbarskaya, 
suggested that the increase might be attributable to the coming of age of the 
generation born in the late 1970s and early 1980s, some reporters are skeptical, 
given that estimates of those individuals generally approach 300,000 – nowhere 
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near the millions listed. The same reporters note that the number of individuals 
who obtained Russian citizenship in the past year ran into the thousands. (1) 
 
While the data reportedly come from the federation components, at least one 
election commission chair could not clear up the confusing and remarkable 
increase. The chairman of the Kaliningrad Oblast’ Electoral Commission said that 
the number of voters in his region had fallen by 3,000 between December and 
January. (2) He did not comment as to whether there was any rise before then, 
say in time for the parliamentary elections. 
 
Candidates may begin running from race 
Aleksandr Veshnyakov, Chairman of the CEC, seems to be confused as to 
where he stands on the handling of the presidential elections. On the one hand, 
he said he was alarmed at the possibility of biased media coverage during the 
campaign as had been seen during the Duma campaign. (3) Yet, the CEC 
refuses to act on complaints of similar blatant support of President Putin by state-
run media. Veshnyakov said coverage only can be regarded as canvassing when 
deliberate intent can be proved. The CEC ruled that complaints launched by 
candidates Irina Khakamada and Nikolai Kharitonov claiming slanted coverage 
cannot be proved, despite the state-run media’s undeniable focus on the 
president (broadcasting Putin's address to his campaign staff in its entirety, for 
example, while ignoring the existence of other candidates). (4) 
 
The absence of even an official reprimand has resulted in the coverage 
remaining unchecked, if not unnoticed. One Moscow newspaper’s monitoring 
during the first two weeks of the campaign showed that "state-controlled 
television channels have given President Vladimir Putin – the undisputed pre-
election favorite – widespread, favorable coverage at the top of primetime 
newscasts. Meanwhile, his six opponents have received paltry, often unfavorable 
coverage." Indeed, Oleg Panfilov, director of the Center for Journalism in 
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Extreme Situations, said he had gained the impression that Putin was the only 
candidate in the race. (5) 
 
Not surprisingly, the candidates challenging Putin have begun to decry their 
unequal treatment in the media. What is surprising is that they may be using the 
obvious media bias, which most expected even before the official campaign 
began, as an excuse to pull out of the contest now. 
 
On 24 February, Khakamada said she might drop out of the race which, she said, 
"is increasingly developing features of lawlessness and falsehood. In this 
situation, the competition of ideas and alternatives is becoming impossible." She 
called on other candidates to follow her example. She later explained that she 
would leave the race if other candidates agreed to do so as well. (6) 
 
At least one of the other candidates has given the notion serious consideration, 
prodded, perhaps, by campaign workers. Yana Dubeykovskaya, Sergei 
Glazyev’s campaign manager, recommended that he drop out of the race, on the 
belief that "it is impossible to run a campaign in conditions of a total news 
blackout." (7) "Our activists are being summoned by various authorities, by 
plenipotentiaries, and are being asked not to carry on with their duties. Attempts 
are being made here to strike a sort of political bargain locally. That's the first 
thing," she said. "Second, the CEC decided to consider the coverage of Putin's 
speech and conference with his activists to be within the law, that he was within 
his right. These were the last straws, so to speak." (8) 
 
Even Ivan Rybkin reported that he may take Khakamada’s advice, (9) despite 
having assured the media, during his dramatic press conference in London on 12 
February, that he "will not withdraw" from the presidential race. (10) 
 
And yet, despite the cries of "foul," no one actually has withdrawn from the race 
which, one must note, they entered fully expecting such treatment. So in a way, it 
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is difficult to take their outrage seriously, simply because they should have 
expected it. And perhaps, that’s the most outrageous aspect of all. 
 
REGIONS 
When 1 + 1 equals a lot less than 2 
Somebody in Kalmykia sorely needs a session of remedial math. While everyone 
seems to agree that there was a demonstration in the capital, Elista, to protest 
the results of the December 2003 Duma election and the continued presence of 
Kalmyk President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, there is some debate about how many 
persons were involved. According to spokesman Vladimir Bambayev, more than 
200 representatives of the Party of Peace and Unity, YABLOKO and the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation gathered to demand Ilyumzhinov’s 
resignation and an investigation into the Duma election results. "Our protest is 
the logical continuation of the rally of many days that was held outside the 
government house in December," Bambayev said. "We have been waiting for the 
answer to the questions that were then raised during the meeting with the 
Russian president’s envoy for the Southern Federal district Viktor Kazantsev, but 
no answer was forthcoming," he added. (11) 
 
According to the deputy presidential envoy, Sergey Yepifantsev, protestors 
numbered no more than a couple of dozen. Those protesters, he said, 
constituted "the radical minority wing of the opposition." (12) 
 
Whatever the number of protesters in February, it represents a substantial 
decrease from the reported 1,000 persons who hit the streets for a three-day 
demonstration in December. At that time, protesters were assured by Kazantsev 
that two commissions would be established to investigate reported falsifications 
during the election and to investigate alleged unconstitutional activity by 




Criminal (in)justice viewed 
Despite much talk of reform last year, the U.S. Department of State’s Country 
Report on Human Rights Practices for 2003 has noted that Russian prison 
conditions "continued to be extremely harsh and frequently life-threatening." (14) 
The danger is not limited to those convicted of crimes, either. Last month in 
Stavropol Territory, a detective of Yessentuki city interior department was 
sentenced to two years imprisonment for using torture as an interrogation tool. A 
week earlier four Stavropol traffic officers were sentenced to four years in prison 
for using torture during interrogations. (15) Apparently, this behavior is neither 
rare nor regional. The State Department cited "credible reports that law 
enforcement personnel frequently engaged in torture, violence, and other brutal 
or humiliating treatment and often did so with impunity. (...) Prisoners' rights 
groups, as well as other human rights groups, documented numerous cases in 
which law enforcement and correctional officials tortured and beat detainees and 
suspects. Human rights groups described the practice of such abuse as 
widespread. Numerous press reports indicated that the police frequently beat 




Motherland’s not-so-happy family 
The split in the Russian Regions Party now is official: Last month, Sergei 
Glazyev stepped down as co-chairman of the party, leaving Dmitri Rogozin as 
sole leader. That may not have been enough of a break for some individuals: 
During the party congress in mid-February to resolve the dispute between the co-
chairmen that erupted over which candidate the party would support, Glazyev or 
Putin, a proposal was made to release Glazyev from his duties and to kick him 
out of the party. (17) One could say that is resolution of a sort. However, both 
political leaders have spent time declaring alternately that their association is 
finished and that this shouldn’t affect how the faction they originally had cobbled 
together will work in the Duma – often in the same breath. One wonders how the 
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rank-and-file are reacting to this amazing display of petty infighting among their 
leadership. 
 
At the congress, Rogozin said he plans to turn the party into a political force 
backing the president. He also said his party would win the majority of seats in 
the 2007 parliamentary elections, an amazingly optimistic forecast given that the 
Motherland (Rodina) bloc, which the Russian Regions Party had created, 
comprised nearly 30 parties and managed to obtain only 9.02 percent in last 
December’s polling. (18) 
 
Rogozin and his backers have sought to change the name of the party to the 
Motherland political party, while Glazyev had declared his intention to set up a 
Motherland party on the basis of the election bloc. That difference alone was 
enough to spur on the public conflict between the two leaders. Glazyev and his 
supporters called upon the Ministry of Justice not to register the Rogozin-led 
Motherland party. Rogozin said he is against "continuing all these feuds," but 
then proceeded to announce that he would not "pronounce the name ‘Glazyev’ 
from now on." (19) 
 
Rogozin won this round; the Justice Ministry reportedly changed the name of the 
Russian Regions Party to the Motherland party in registration documents. (20) 
Glazyev termed the name change "a treacherous stab in the back" by one of the 
parties comprising the Motherland bloc; he subsequently said he hoped this 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Kris Beasly and Paul Lyons 
 
"In"-Security 2004 
Russia’s largest military exercise in twenty years ended with a bang last week. 
Make that several bangs, some good, some bad. The exercise, previously 
referred to by the Russian media as "Global Shield" (1) but now officially 
designated "Security 2004" by the Russian General Staff (2), included two 
successful launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the successful 
orbiting of a military satellite, about 20 long-range bomber sorties and, in the 
conventional forces, the redeployment of several "permanent readiness" Army 
units from one end of Russia to the other for training with Air Force aircraft. But 
the good news was overshadowed by the dramatic launch failures by two 
Northern Fleet missile submarines. (3) President Vladimir Putin, observed both 
the fleet exercises and ICBM and satellite launches in person and said at a news 
conference at Plesetsk, "There are pluses and minuses in the current exercises. 
The minuses will be identified and we will draw conclusions [about what needs to 
be done to fix the problems]." (4) 
 
So what went well and what went poorly? In a post-exercise briefing on 20 Feb 
04, First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, Colonel-General Yuri 
Baluyevskiy, handed out the scorecard. First, just to make sure they weren’t 
completely forgotten, he reminded journalists that two of the newly labeled 
"permanent readiness" Army units conducted rail-borne deployment and field 
firing exercises. One unit from the Siberian Military District (MD) deployed to a 
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live-fire training area in the Moscow MD and conducted joint training with Air 
Force fighters and fighter-bombers, while a similar unit from the Volga-Urals MD 
took a much shorter train trip to the North Caucasus region and back, but didn’t 
conduct live fire training, probably due to lack of funds or a suitable training 
ground. (5) 
 
However, there was never any doubt that the main goal of the exercise was to 
display the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation. In fact, the 
exercise was labeled as a "strategic command and staff drill" and the vast 
majority of the exercise revolved around strategic forces. During the exercise, 
Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers conducted about 20 sorties simulating their 
nuclear delivery flight plans, capped by the launching of several unarmed, but 
nuclear-capable, air-launched cruise missiles in Arctic test areas. (6) 
 
On 17 Feb 04, the Russian Navy stepped up to bat. With President Putin on a 
day cruise aboard the sub "Arkhangelsk" to observe the action, the newest fleet 
ballistic missile submarine in the Navy, the Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) class 
boat "Novomoskovsk" conducted launch drills to fire off two of its 16 RSM-54 
"Sineva" (SS-N-23) sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). But neither missile 
ever left the launch tube. The Russian media immediately labeled the event a 
failure and it was many hours later that Navy Commander-in-Chief, Admiral 
Vladimir Kuroyedov announced that the "Novomoskovsk" launches were 
"simulated" or "notional." He said, "A notional launch is when the entire chain of 
preparations for launch takes place and there is a notional electronic launch of 
the missile without its emerging from the tube." (7) However, the military press 
releases prior to the exercise had stated these were to be live launches, so most 
Russian analysts believe these were intended to be actual launches. In fact, both 
Izvestiya and Kommersant, quoting their own sources at Northern Fleet 
headquarters, reported that Captain First Rank Rachuk, the sub’s skipper, 
discovered a failure of the weapon control system during pre-launch 
preparations. These sources pointed out that this was the first attempt to conduct 
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a launch in many years without a technical expert from the missile design bureau 
on board. (8) President Putin, leaving the Navy high and dry, said nothing and 
simply departed his submarine ride after exchanging a picture of the Kremlin for 
a model of the "Arkhangelsk." Like a man trying to see all the spectacular rides at 
the county fair, he made his way to the Plesetsk ICBM and space launch base a 
couple of hundred kilometers south for the next day’s activities. (9) 
 
The Russian military planned a spectacular end to the strategic portion of the 
exercise on 18 Feb 04, involving four launches in less than three and a half 
hours. First up, at 10:05 Moscow Time, was the launch of a Molniya-M space 
launch vehicle from Plesetsk, which put a Molniya-1T military communications 
satellite into its normal elongated polar orbit, which enables it to spend about 20 
of every 24 hours in view of the northern latitudes. In such an orbit, its primary 
use is to communicate between the national leadership and the strategic forces, 
especially bombers and submarines. Less than two hours later, at noon Moscow 
Time, a liquid-fueled RS-18 (SS-19 "Stileto") ICBM with six independently 
targetable re-entry vehicles was launched from a test silo at Baikonur, 
Kazakhstan to the Kura test range in Kamchatka. This 69th launch of the RS-18 
was successful, and combined with other engineering tests, enabled the 
Strategic Missile Force (RVSN) to extend its service life date to 2015. Shortly 
after that, the Northern Fleet was given a second go, using the same type of 
equipment used on 17 Feb. At 12:30, the nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
submarine (SSBN) "Karelia" punched a RSM-54 (SS-N-23) missile towards 
Kamchatka, leaving no doubt it was to be a live, not "notional" firing. 
Unfortunately, the missile suffered a catastrophic failure 98 seconds after lift-off, 
at the moment the first and second stages separate. Since this was a test and 
training launch, the missile was unarmed and had a self-destruct package 
aboard, which properly activated when the SLBM went off-course, spectacularly 
destroying the missile. But the show must go on, and the last of the day’s loud 
and flashy events occurred at 13:28 Moscow Time when the pride of the RSVN, 
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a new solid-fueled Topol-M ICBM lifted off from its road-mobile launcher near 
Plesetsk and accurately made its way to Kura range. (10) 
 
The reverberations of the blast from the SLBM-sized Roman candle had only 
begun to fade when the political reverberations began. Immediately, 
commissions were set up to examine both failures (the notional launch on 17 Feb 
and the self-destruction on 18 Feb), the FSB moved in "to secure the files" at 
Northern Fleet and both the design bureau and the manufacturing plant began to 
point fingers at each other and the "poorly-trained" sailors. (11) President Putin, 
having watched the two Plesetsk launches, once again chose to say little about 
the Navy failure. Obviously pleased by his two day pre-election jaunt, when he 
got to appear on state-run TV in two different military uniforms (Navy and 
camouflaged), he chose to announce that one of the ICBM launches was in fact 
a test of a new, maneuvering re-entry vehicle, which he said no other country in 
the world had. (12) But, in a fairly disingenuous statement, Putin said, "The 
development of new arms is not directed against the United States. We will do 
everything to ensure that our former adversaries become [note his verb-tense] 
partners and our partners become allies." (13) 
 
Clearly, the real audiences for this exercise were the Russian voting population 
and the leadership of the numerous states that border Russia. The views of 
Russia’s chief neo-imperialist, President Vladimir Putin, accurately reflect the 
wistful longing of both his people and his military for the days when the military 
weight, and especially the nuclear clout, of the Soviet Union gave it status as a 
world superpower. Led by Putin, Russia hoped this display of nuclear potential in 
2004 would enable Russia to regain, in the eyes of the world, her former status. 
Naturally, Putin hopes to reap the benefit domestically in election winning votes 
next month, and externally, by leveraging an aging, rusting nuclear cudgel into 
real economic and political authority around the world. But exercise "Security 
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While developments in Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Haiti and Libya have 
understandably dominated center stage recently, events such as Russia’s large-
scale strategic exercise and its attempts to increase its influence within both the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Baltic States is creating 
friction in the U.S.-Russian partnership. Additionally, recent flights of NATO 
AWACS reconnaissance planes in the vicinity of Russia’s military and strategic 
command-staff exercise has met with strong disapproval – and is fueling the 
budding impasse among Russia, the United States and NATO over issues 
concerning the CIS and the Baltic. 
 
It is no wonder that "Russian ties with the CIS – viewed by Russia as a region of 
‘special interest’ and within Russia’s traditional sphere of influence – have long 
been a prime concern in Russia’s foreign policy [and that] Russia hopes a CIS 
with strong links to Russia will curb U.S. and NATO influences in the region." (1) 
Judging from the pervasive diplomatic efforts undertaken by President Putin, 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov across the CIS 
and the Baltic States since 1999, it is clear that Russia’s resurgent imperialism is 
anchored first and foremost in its neighborhood and former strongholds. 
Recently, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, during testimony to the U.S. Senate 
Intelligence Committee, opined that "by increasing its defense spending, Moscow 
is aiming to regain the status of a world power." (2) CIA Director George Tenet 
reiterated the growing U.S. concern over President Putin’s centralization of 
power and the fact that "Moscow has become more coercive with regards to its 
neighbors" (3) during similar testimony. Regardless of the debate concerning the 
specific mission(s) of the AWACS flights during 23 and 24 February, prudence 
prevails. The AWACS presence may offer a prescription to a growing malady in 
the region – specifically to Russian flexing of its military muscle in advance of the 
Baltic states’ entry into NATO in April. 
 
 27 
The AWACS flights themselves were not conducted in Russian airspace, and 
therefore a Russian representative was not allowed to observe the flights. The 
Foreign Ministry’s official statement conveys Russian anger however, claiming 
that the AWACS episode "annoys Russia because it contravenes the agreement 
on mutual relations and cooperation between Russia and NATO." (4) It is 
pertinent to note that Russia has petitioned NATO for access to NATO’s facilities 
and bases within the CIS (and in the future, the Baltic) but that request has not 
been granted and is unlikely to gain any traction. That said, NATO Early Warning 
and Control Force Commander, Major General Harry Winterberger, stipulated to 
ITAR-TASS that Russia was told "about the flight details and route in advance 
[adding] that the flight aimed to show Latvian partners what machinery NATO 
had." (5) 
 
This explanation mimics the Lithuanian position that the show flight of the E-3 
AWACS was vital to integrating Lithuania into the fabric of the NATO air defense 
system and attaining a technical understanding of NATO’s air capabilities. 
Reaction from the Russian military was commensurate with that of the Foreign 
Ministry. "Russian air force command is troubled by the flights. The flights of an 
AWACS aircraft in the airspace of Latvia and Lithuania will permit deep air 
reconnaissance in the northwestern part of Russia and Belarus, which can not 
help arousing concern." (6) 
 
The expansion of the NATO alliance may strain diplomatic efforts between the 
U.S. and Russia as interests and status clash over the former Eastern bloc and 
Soviet countries. Finally however, these disagreements are viewed more 
candidly, and with an eye on respect for sovereignty, as well as simply concern 
for Russia's wounded sense of empire. 
 
The nuclear triad 
The recent failures of three RSM-54 missiles from the nuclear submarines K-406 
Novomoskovsk and the Karelia during the Security 2004 strategic command-staff 
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exercises have broad implications. More so than determining the technical cause 
of the misfires, the failures themselves question the viability of the Navy’s role in 
Russia’s nuclear triad – and its ability to uphold its charter as curator to one third 
of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. 
 
The recent debacle in the Navy’s Northern Fleet follows less than a year on the 
heels of the K-159 incident and recalls he recent Kursk tragedy. Against that 
backdrop, the Northern Fleet lacks the requisite leadership to transcend its 
mistakes and charter a new course consistent with its obligations and 
expectations. The dismissal of successive Northern Fleet Commanders Admiral 
Popov and Admiral Suchkov, following the Kursk and K-159 tragedies, fails to 
inspire confidence or to instill a sense of preparedness in the fleet. Yet, this 
recent failure falls on the watch of acting Northern Fleet Commander, Admiral 
Simonenko, who, it is safe to say, will not get the nod from President Putin to fill 
the position permanently. 
 
Fleet Admiral Kuroyedov might not want to rest comfortably either. The missile 
firing debacles are the latest in a string of miscues during his tenure. Defaulting 
to the historic accountability norms within the Russian military, Admiral 
Kuroyedov actually posited that the "actual launches had never been planned." 
(7) Well, the Federal Security Service (FSB), which has been actively engaged in 
determining fault, will surely decipher the root cause of the failure during the 
course of its ongoing investigation. 
 
Perhaps General Anatoli Kornukov, former Air Force Commander, has succinctly 
surmised the root cause before the FSB concludes its efforts. He states, 
"Russia’s ballistic missile defense systems are in a pitiful state…we owe this 
state of affairs to under-funding, a lack of modernization of the systems, and 
optimization and reduction…in other words, the inability to launch missiles is not 
the worst problem of all. The inability to defend ourselves is." (8) 
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The concern expressed by Kornukov is conventional. Government, academics 
and former military elites echo similar concerns – the Navy’s combat readiness is 
incongruent with its obligations and responsibilities to the nuclear triad. The 
answer on how to remedy this situation rests not in the defense industry but 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
UKRAINE 
Mental or criminal case? 
On February 18, Valeri Kravchenko, a Ukrainian foreign intelligence service 
general and an adviser to the Ukrainian embassy in Berlin, walked into the Berlin 
studio of the Russian service of the German international broadcaster Deutsche 
Welle and accused the Ukrainian authorities of authorizing spying on opposition 
leaders and high government officials. 
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In particular, Kravchenko stated that he was ordered by SBU (Ukrainian Security 
Service), in turn supported by the authorities, to spy on government members, 
"starting from ministers and higher up" and opposition leaders abroad, which he 
had refused to do. (1) He was ordered to look out for the individuals criticizing 
Ukraine and its present leadership and supporting the opposition. Borys 
Tarasyuk, a former foreign minister and now an opposition member, was one of 
the people to be watched. (2) In support of his claims, Kravchenko said he had 
the documentary evidence, which he was ready to pass to the Prosecutor-
General's Office of Ukraine and the Human Rights Committee of the Ukrainian 
Supreme Council. Kravchenko said he had received personal threats after he 
had made his intentions clear. 
 
There are, of course, those (especially within SBU) who dismiss Kravchenko's 
allegations and accuse him of everything from mental disorders to pursuing 
personal interests. According to Volodymyr Radchenko, a former SBU officer, 
Kravchenko has financial reasons for his actions, namely his desire to stay in 
Germany for one more year and earn additional income. (3) Kuchma completely 
dismissed Kravchenko's accusations, calling them "absolutely absurd." (4) 
 
When analyzing the situation, two most likely scenarios come to mind. The first 
stems from the internal developments in SBU. Once the new leadership, Ihor 
Smeshko - SBU chief and Oleh Synyansky - the head of the Main Intelligence 
Directorate, was in place, approximately 40 percent of the leading staff was 
suspended. The staff had been in an uncertain position for four or five months, 
which had a demoralizing effect on people and provoked many protests from 
within the special service's staff. (5) With the arrival of Smeshko and Synyansky, 
new rules and a new atmosphere have developed, forcing the employees to 
spend less time on their direct professional duties and dragging them more into 
domestic political games. Thus, Kravchenko's accusations could simply be a 
revenge on the new leadership. 
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The second possibility lacks any intrigues, accusation of mental insanity or 
pursuit of personal gains. It is quite possible that Kravchenko is simply an honest 
man, who refused to break the law and step over the moral boundaries and 
decided to expose the Ukrainian authorities of illegal activities. In 2001, Kuchma 
signed a law on intelligence agencies, according to which an intelligence officer 
has no right to interfere into the politics of Ukraine and especially in the activities 
of the opposition parties. (6) Kravchenko's accusations do not sound that wild in 
light of Kuchma's alleged involvement in the murder of a journalist Georgy 
Gondadze. Another former security officer, fugitive presidential guard Mykola 
Melnychenko, released wiretapped recordings in 2001, which revealed Kuchma's 
connection to Georgy Gandadze murder, provoking one of the biggest scandals 
in the history of independent Ukraine. Maybe Kravchenko is not deranged after 
all, but a person who has courage to stand up to corruption and lawlessness in 
the government, even if he stands alone. 
 
BELARUS 
Is the "Big Brother" instinct still alive? 
After a period of arguments and threats, Russian gas giant Gazprom finally 
halted its supply of gas to Belarus on February 18. It promptly restored it on 
February 20, after Lukashenko's hysteria on Belarussian television and his 
concession to sign the deal on Russian terms. Currently, Belarus owes $114 
million in gas bills to Gazprom and $40 million to alternative Russian gas 
suppliers Itera and Trans-nafta. (7) Gazprom has been supplying Belarus with 
natural gas at Russian domestic prices ($29 per thousand cubic meters), which is 
almost twice as low as what Russia charges other former Soviet Union republics 
(approximately $50) and almost four times less than the market price ($110). 
Supplying gas at such low prices has been agreed in exchange for selling a 
controlling stake in Beltransgaz, which operates the Belrussian gas transport and 
distribution network. Russia never received a chance to participate in the tender. 
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Lukashenko called Russian actions "blackmail" and accused Moscow of freezing 
the Belarussians, when the outside temperature was below -20 degrees Celsius. 
Lukashenko passionately stated: "If Putin wants us to pay that money, let us take 
it from funding set aside to provide medication to Chernobyl survivors and war 
veterans. How could we fail to collect $200 million? Let's collect it and solve this 
problem, so others will stop manipulating and blackmailing us."(8) This statement 
deserves at least two comments. First, in Lukashenko's view, "blackmail" is the 
Russian desire to buy a stake in Beltransgaz for less than its worth. Moscow 
offered $600 million for a controlling stake in Beltransgaz, when Lukashenko 
wants $5 billion for it – an estimate a little too high for a company which requires 
a modernization investment of approximately $1 billion, has pitiful $60 million in 
profits a year and is equipped with old pipelines valued at $600 million. (9) When 
Gazprom proposed to hire independent consultants to evaluate the company, 
Beltransgaz refused. 
 
As for taking money away from the social needs of the veterans and Chernobyl 
survivors, the president should be delighted to discover that he need not deprive 
these two groups of money, all he should do is simply stop stealing. Even though 
Belarus is paying $29 per thousand cubic meters for Russian gas, it sells it to 
Belarussian consumers for $48. (10) It is a mystery where the profit goes. This 
money has certainly not been added to the Belarussian social budget. 
 
Despite the presidential hyperbole that accompanied this concession to Russia, 
Belarus and Moscow still manage to agree on terms that favor Belarus on many 
other issues, e.g., Russia offered Belarus a very low interest loan for gas 
payments, which is not likely to be repaid. So why, time and again, does Russia 
acquiesce to Lukashenko? Why does it still try to strike deals with him after he 
lied numerous times about the introduction of the Russian rubl', about paying for 




First, Russia is so eager to expand its "liberal empire" and acquire its neighbors' 
assets that it is willing to operate at a loss for years and jeopardizes relations 
with Europe: In the dispute with Belarus, when Russia turned off the gas supply, 
it also cut off Europe (which accounts for 17% of Russian gas) as Belarus is the 
conduit for the pipeline. The result of the action was harsh European criticism for 
Russia and tremendous financial losses for Gazprom). 
 
More convincing however, is the argument that Belarus, as a reliable ally and 
buffer state between Europe and Russia is of immense security value. For 
sentimental reasons as well, Russia remains so attached to some of its former 
satellites that it is willing to sacrifice profits, which could in turn, be used to help 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
GEORGIA 
Can Saakashvili Succeed Where Shevardnadze Failed? 
While Mikheil Saakashvili’s visit to Washington from 23-28 February was a 
success that secured the reinstating of IMF assistance in April and President 
Bush’s praise for the Rose Revolution, (1) recent events indicate a warming of 
relations between Georgia and Russia as well. 
 
Prior to his Washington visit, Saakashvili’s previously harsh rhetoric regarding 
the Russian military presence in Georgia ameliorated to such a degree that, 
according to Saakashvili, the "Russian military bases in Georgia had no military 
importance for either country" (2) while "internal security" threats were the main 
concern of the Georgian defense apparatus. (3) Saakashvili’s reference to 
domestic threats may have pertained to the apparent infiltration of Chechen 
rebels into Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge as on 17 February, the Russian Federal 
Border Protection Service and the Georgian State Border Protection Service 
signed an agreement in Moscow jointly to patrol Georgia’s border with 
Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechnya. (4) Designs for further bilateral integration 
of the Georgian and Russia military institutions are definite as indicated by an 
announcement by Russian Embassy Press Spokesman Yevgeni Ivanov that both 
countries had discussed a range of possible venues of military cooperation, 
including the training of Georgian officers in Russian military academies. (5) 
Meanwhile, the Georgian Defense Minister Gela Bezhuashvili stated that the 
Georgian General Staff had started selecting candidates to be sent to Russia for 
training. 
 
Saakashvili is attempting to mesh a solid commitment to and support of the US, 
[as demonstrated by his continuous support for Georgian integration into NATO 
(6)] with the various internal and external pressures facing Georgia. The 
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geopolitical realities of the US-Russian rivalry, the Georgian clan divisions, the 
country’s rebellious republics as well as Georgia’s crushing road to economic 
viability were too much for Shevardnadze. Only time will tell how Saakashvili 
fares where the older and far more experienced, statesman failed. 
 
ADJARIA 
The recent violence and tension between Aslan Abashidze’s government and the 
Adjarian political opposition movement may threaten the potential for better 
relations between Tbilisi and Batumi. In an interview with the Russian newspaper 
Gazeta, Abashidze, following his recent contacts with Saakashvili, stated his 
support for stable, respectful relations between the two governments. (7) 
However, on 20 February, violence broke out in Batumi between the Adjarian 
opposition movement and supporters of Abashidze, (8) followed by attacks on 
the Christian Democratic Party on 21 February and Our Adjaria headquarters on 
23 February. (9) Additionally, there are various reports of opposition leaders, 
such as the chief of the Batumi branch of the Christian Democratic Party Avtandil 
Darchia being kidnapped, beaten and threatened. (10) The tensions between the 
Adjarian opposition and the Batumi government spilled over into Tbilisi on 24 
February when the arrest of two Adjarian students in Tbilisi for illegal weapons 
possession became the apparent cause of conflict between Georgian 
parliamentarians. (11) These events prompted an about-face in Adjarian rhetoric 
and on 23 February Adjaria Interior Minister Djemal Gogitidze accused "outside 
forces," (11) a clear reference to Saakashvili’s government, of instigating the 
violence while on 25 February, Abashidze stated that Tbilisi was planning military 
action against Batumi. (12) Meanwhile, the special representative for PACE, 
Secretary-General Walter Schwimmer, who witnessed the violence between 20-
23 February, is currently in Batumi to "clarify relations" between Adjarian and 
Georgian authorities, while also potentially mediating between Abashidze’s 




You can talk the talk, but can you walk the walk? 
Ilham Aliev’s recent overtures towards Moscow and Tehran have called into 
question the degree to which Ilham will remain loyal to the late father’s foreign 
policy of balancing the competing interests of Russia and the United States in 
way that best serves Azerbaijan’s interests. 
 
Indeed, Ilham’s interest in an expanded relationship with Russia, a dynamic shift 
from the steady Azeri policy for integration into NATO, was demonstrated in the 
immediate aftermath of the Azeri president’s 6-8 February Moscow visit. At the 
conclusion of the talks, Putin and Aliev signed a declaration reaffirming a 1997 
Friendship and Cooperation Treaty which stipulates that the two countries 
support "each other’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity." (14) 
During his Moscow visit, Aliev further assured Putin that no foreign troops would 
be permanently stationed in Azerbaijan, (15) a clear retreat from Aliev’s position 
during his December meeting in Baku with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, where the possible deployment of U.S. or NATO troops to provide 
security for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan was suggested. Indeed, in an interview given 
to the Russian daily Izvestiya, Aliev played down the possibility of Azerbaijan 
joining Western institutions and referred to NATO membership as "a matter of the 
future…on which discussion is premature." (16) Foreign troop deployment does 
not restrict bilateral military cooperation, though, and on 19 February, Azerbaijan 
and Moscow signed an agreement by which Russia will supply Azerbaijan with 
military parts and host Azerbaijani officers in Russian military academies. (17) In 
addition to closer military ties with Russia, Azerbaijan has reportedly been 
considering, although made no official decision as of yet, an Iranian proposal for 
both bilateral military cooperation and the construction of a gas-pipeline between 
Iran and the Nakhichevan Republic. (18) 
 
Aliev’s desire to create security between Azerbaijan and Russia extends beyond 
the military zone and into the economic realm as evidenced in the 
aforementioned Izvestiya interview in which Aliev downplayed the singular 
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importance of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline as compared with the currently 
operational Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. (19) During the Moscow-Baku meeting, 
the two sides discussed Russia’s attempt to transport more Azeri oil across 
Russian territory in competition with the BTC pipeline. Putin may have also 
pressed Aliev to double the flow on the Baku-Novo pipeline from the current 2.5 
million metric tons a year to the line’s total capacity of 5 million tons. Aliev skirted 
the exact logistics of the pipelines, though, by stating it was not a "question for 
today" and called for further talks. At the same time, Aliev expressed his 
confidence that the Baku-Novo pipeline would work at full capacity in the near 
future, (20) while mentioning the potential of using the BTC pipeline to transport 
Russian oil. (21) 
 
At present, Ilham Aliev is trying to navigate a path between Western and Russian 
competition while extracting the maximum gain for Azerbaijan from both power 
players. The Azeri president’s recent warm advances to Moscow may also be 
due to a desire to guarantee Russian support in a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement, 
of which negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia are perpetually in flux. 
However, the success of such a balancing act requires a charismatic leader with 
the support of civil society, and Azerbaijan possesses neither. Additionally, Aliev 
lacks experience, does not enjoy an unrivaled hold on power, and has yet to 
demonstrate the sheer tenacity to manage such a high-stakes juggling act. 
These constraints, if combined with the onset of Western pressure, could fully 




(1) Washington Post, 25 Feb 04 via Lexis-Nexis 
(2) Agence France Presse, 12 Feb 04 via Lexis-Nexis 
(3) Rustavi-2 TV, Tbilisi, 14 Feb 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis 
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(5) Kommersant, 25 Feb 04; What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Negotiating extremism and rethinking relations 
Fighting terrorism has been one area where the countries of Central Asia have 
been successful in cooperation. In the political reshuffling that the threat of 
terrorism has brought to the region, China, Russia and the U.S. have become 
more involved, but they are at the point of needing to consider what their long-
term military role in the region will become. Even while countries have forged 
closer anti-terror relations, the recent difficulty in negotiating a solution to the 
flood threat of the Syr-Darya River exemplifies the challenge of cooperating on 
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social issues and has led some to consider alternative ways to circumvent inter-
state reliance. 
 
Cooperating against extremism 
A wave of arrests and requests for extraditions has spotlighted the cooperation 
between Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Russian police recently 
arrested Mukhamad Ismatov, a Tajik citizen wanted for organizing an 
international criminal group and an assassination attempt of a public figure; (1) 
Yoqub Salimov, a former Tajik Interior Minister accused of treason; (2) and 
Yusup Kasimakhunov, an Uzbek and purported leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). (3) 
The extradition of all of them has been requested. 
 
Extradition is not uncommon, of course, but the level of cooperation is more 
public than it has been. Russia, which has the death penalty, but has not applied 
it since joining the Council of Europe, extradited Salimov on the grounds that he 
might face capital punishment in Tajikstan. (4) Uzbekistan, which as recently as 
16 February sentenced Aziz Karimov to death, will likely be forced to forgo the 
option of capital punishment in exchange for the extradition of Kasimakhunov. (5) 
 
The arrest of Kasimakhunov represents the regional unease with HT and an 
international willingness to cede to (political) requests in the name of national 
security. HT is banned throughout Central Asia and much of the Middle East, (6) 
where its re-traditionalist agenda is viewed as threatening, and Uzbekistan is 
known for being exceptionally draconian in dealing with members of HT. In 
Uzbekistan, where upwards of 5000 political prisoners are detained for affiliation 
with HT, possession of HT literature carries a ten-year prison term. (7) According 
to Komiljon Kodirov of the Uzbek National Security Service, Kasimakhunov is 
wanted for his "active part in the publishing and delivering to Central Asia of large 
consignments of literature of a religious and extremist nature calling to overthrow 
the legal government of Uzbekistan." (8) 
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There are regular reports of HT members being detained and arrested for 
distributing HT literature and in the six years that HT has been in Tajikistan, over 
200 members have been imprisoned. (9) In the past two months alone, however, 
more than 30 members of HT have been arrested and one Tajik law-enforcement 
official was quoted as having said, "recently, the extremists virtually began 
coming out from underground and openly propagating their ultimate and genuine 
goals – setting up a single theocratic state on the territories of Central Asia…." 
(10) 
 
On 30 January, six individuals were detained in Jalal-Abad, Kyrgyzstan, for 
distributing HT literature. They were allegedly tortured and threatened with 
extradition to Uzbekistan before cooperating with authorities and subsequently 
being released. (11) Freedom House, a U.S.-based NGO devoted to peace and 
democracy, was criticized by the Kyrgyz government for being outspoken about 
the case. (12) 
 
Rethinking relations 
The threat of terrorism has brought international attention to Central Asia, a 
significant amount of military investment, and anti-terror cooperation agreements. 
Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Askar Aytmatov referred to China, Russia, and the U.S. 
as the "guarantees [sic] of [Kyrgyzstan’s] national security." (13) After the 200 
South Korean troops, part of the international antiterrorist coalition, leave the 
Ganci airbase at Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan, the multinational component of the 
coalition will cease; only American troops will remain at the base. (14) And with 
the Russian airbase in Kant functioning as part of a regional antiterrorist coalition, 
U.S. officials have made it clear that there will not be Russian-U.S. competition 
over Central Asian military bases. (15) 
 
The recent visit to the region by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was 
concerned with reaffirming the Bush administration’s support for the Central 
Asian governments in the "war on terrorism." But he ignored international 
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criticism of repressive behavior, particularly that of Uzbek President Islam 
Karimov. (16) A report by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis suggests that 
the U.S. policy of ignoring the shortcomings of economic and political reform in 
countries like Uzbekistan could incite anti-Americanism and undermine long term 
security interests. (17) And as the campaign in Afghanistan wears on, political 
objectives at home will force the U.S. to reevaluate its role in Central Asia. 
 
Intra-regional relations are also being reconsidered. While the countries of 
Central Asia are able to cooperate in the anti-terrorism efforts and have 
advanced a number of trade agreements, the recent flood threat of the Syr-Darya 
River (18) demonstrated their inability to cooperate on issues where competing 
interests are at stake. Though the flood threat has subsided, (19) Kazakhstan 
has taken steps to circumvent any future need for international cooperation on 
the matter and is preparing to build a reservoir to control flooding. According to 
Anatoli Ryabtsev, chairman of the Agriculture Ministry’s Committee for Water 
Resources, this "will end our dependence. We tried to conduct legal dialogue 
with neighbors in order to solve the problem. Unfortunately, we have not 
managed to do so as yet…. Every state is defending its own interests, and 
Kazakhstan suffers as it is in the lower reaches of the Syr-Darya River. Therefore 
there is no choice but for us to start building a counter regulator." (20) It is this 
sense of resignation and resultant approach of self-reliance that could have 
broader implications on social issues which do not require the states to 




(1) Ismatov has been on Tajikistan’s "Wanted" list since March 2002 and is 
suspected of having numerous connections with international terrorist 
organizations. Reportedly, he has confessed to having been trained in an Afghan 
terrorist camp and prior to extradition he is being questioned for participation in 
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SOV-2004-0229 via World News Connection. 
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0224 via World News Connection. 
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for troops in Afghanistan. ITAR-TASS, 0846 GMT, 25 Feb 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-
0225 via World News Connection. 
(15) Richard Hoagland, US Ambassador to Tajikistan, recently said that the US 
would neither "have permanent military bases" nor "compete with Russian 
military bases" in Central Asia. ITAR-TASS, 0840 GMT, 26 Feb 04; FBIS-SOV-
2004-0226 via World News Connection. 
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